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ABSTRACT 
Burning Budgets: Does an Institutional Blank-Check Raise the Severity and Cost of 
Fighting Wildland Fires? 
 
by 
 
Devin T. Stein, Master of Science 
Utah State University, 2017 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Ryan Yonk 
Department: Economics and Finance 
 
 
This article uses a public choice perspective to analyze the institutions and 
incentives that fire managers face. The theoretical framework posited here suggests that a 
vicious cycle of fire suppression exists in the United States driven by an institutional-
blank-check.  
The “institutional-blank-check” theory is tested with regression analysis that 
attempts to explain fire suppression expenditures, the cost per acre of suppression, and 
the probability of a budget increase for the U.S. Forest Service in the continental United 
States. The results from these tests suggest that political factors, including injuries from 
wildfires and the number of politicians from a state sitting on the House of 
Representatives’ Appropriations Committee, the oversight committee tasked with 
managing wildfire management expenditures for the U.S. Forest Service, do play 
significant roles in determining the amount spent in each state on fire suppression.  
iv 
 
These results suggest that political institutions are decisive in determining how 
much is spent on suppressing wildfires in the United States. Reforming these institutions 
could be a key component in improving wildfire and forest management in the United 
States.  
 (42 pages) 
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT 
Burning Budgets: Does an Institutional Blank-Check Raise the Severity and Cost of 
Fighting Wildland Fires? 
Devin T. Stein 
 
In conducting this research, I wanted to explore whether political incentives have 
a significant effect on wildfire management in the United States. I attempt to answer this 
question by proving a theoretical justification for why wildfires may become more 
expensive to fight and severe to manage because of political institutions. I then attempt to 
provide some hard evidence to support this theory by using regression analysis. My 
analysis suggests that political factors do matter for wildfire suppression funding, 
although I was unable to find strong enough evidence to suggest that these political 
factors are actually driving more severe wildfires. 
This research contributes to the literature on public choice theory, a branch of 
political economy that looks at government from the individual decision makers’ level. 
Additionally, this research contributes to the literature on what affects wildfire 
suppression effectiveness and funding. This research may contribute to future analyses of 
the institutions that make U.S. wildland firefighters more or less capable of effectively 
managing wildfires to protect human lives, property, and forests.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On October 25, 2003, a fire erupted in San Diego County, California, that 
destroyed nearly 3,000 buildings and spread at up to 40,000 acres per hour (Lakeside 
Historical Society, n.d.). The conflagration killed more than a dozen people and injured 
more than 100 others, which attracted substantial political and media attention. United 
States House Representative Duncan Hunter’s home was threatened by the fire (it 
eventually would burn), and he called Ray Quintanar, a regional aviation chief for the 
U.S. Forest Service, demanding that aircraft be dispatched to attack the fire. Quintanar 
refused because high winds and poor visibility would make use of the aircraft ineffective. 
But after Hunter called the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington, D.C., six 
C-130 Hercules transports were sent to fight the fire (Cart and Boxall, 2008).   
Quintanar believed that those planes did very little to control the fire, but he 
characterized the response as a “political air show,” or a “CNN drop.” Such political air 
shows are described by the Los Angeles Times as “the high-profile use of expensive 
aircraft to appease elected officials” (Cart and Boxall, 2008). Despite their 
ineffectiveness, aerial drops make good television coverage of wildfire responses, which 
shows the public that their elected leaders are taking immediate and drastic steps to 
ensure their safety.  
This story illustrates the political forces that underlie fire suppression in the 
United States. Although fire experts generally understand effective wildfire management 
2 
strategies, politics often gets in the way. When centralized political forces with no 
wildfire management experience have greater control of wildfire suppression strategies 
than the experts, it is unsurprising that larger fire-suppression budgets are not reducing 
the severity of U.S. wildfires (Brusentsev and Vroman, 2016). This article explores the 
political factors and institutions that may be reducing the efficiency of managing 
wildfires.  
The technologies and tactics used for wildfire management are improving 
continually, yet there is no clear evidence that these agencies are getting better results 
(Ingalsbee, 2010). The annual number of acres burned in wildfires has grown 
significantly in past decades, and federal fire-suppression expenditures are skyrocketing 
(Brusentsev and Vroman, 2016). Widespread debate about the causes points generally to 
past suppression efforts, drought conditions, climate change, and economic development 
in the wildland-urban interface (Gebert and Black, 2012).   
I suggest another cause for more acres burned and larger wildfire suppression 
costs: an institutional weakness in current fire suppression policy. Although the existing 
literature looks at individual fire manager behavior and the perverse incentives faced, as 
well as risk management and decision making under uncertainty, no studies yet have tried 
to bring an institutional analysis of political processes to bear in explaining fire outcomes. 
This study will not look at traditional causes of greater wildfire severity and higher costs, 
but rather suggest that political institutions may be a driving factor. 
More expensive and severe wildfires in the United States are an important policy 
issue because wildfires can damage communities, timber resources, human lives, wildlife, 
as well as impact soil conditions, watersheds, and water quality. The existing literature 
3 
generally attributes the increase in wildfires to past fire suppression efforts and climate 
change. This paper uses public choice analysis to suggest an alternative hypothesis: that 
wildfires are becoming more severe in the United States because of political incentives 
that raise fire-suppression spending. The theory is supported by a series of statistical tests 
that suggest that political factors do have a significant effect on wildfire suppression 
expenditures. 
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BACKGROUND  
 
 
In 1908, Congress passed the Forest Fires Emergency Act, which allowed the 
newly created U.S. Forest Service (USFS) to exceed its appropriated budget (i.e., run a 
deficit) on fire suppression to prevent forest fires from destroying the timber reserves the 
agency was supposed to protect. Because fires were uncontrollable at the time, budget 
constraints were considered unthinkable, and a blank-check policy ensured that the USFS 
would be able to fund fire suppression efforts.  
During the early days of the USFS, wildfires were so dangerous that they were 
viewed as a war on the home front. Any suggestion of actively managing fires using 
practices like light-burning were considered heresy because these fires would threaten 
more lives (Pyne, 1996). For the next several decades, wildfire suppression had almost 
unanimous congressional and public support. 
It was not until the 1970s that forest ecologists reached a consensus that many 
North American forests were fire-adapted ecosystems that actually needed periodic 
burning. In 1978, Congress repealed the Forest Fires Emergency Act, forcing the USFS 
to manage fires more holistically and economically. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the 
USFS managed fires cost-effectively, borrowing funding from the agency’s reforestation 
budget for bad fire years and replenishing it on their own in good years (Berry, 2007). 
Perhaps not surprisingly, those were the years with the fewest number of acres burned in 
wildfires, as shown in Figure 1, although the period also was wetter than average. 
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Source: National Interagency Coordination Center. 
Figure 1. Acres Burned by Wildfires, 1960-2015. 
 
Then, in 1988, conditions were drier than normal and Yellowstone National Park 
was experimenting with “let-burn” policies that allowed most naturally caused fires to 
spread without human control. A series of wildfires erupted, burning more than a third of 
the park over the course of one summer. As the world’s first national park, the 
Yellowstone fires attracted substantial media attention. The National Park Service, 
coordinating with the USFS, severely overspent on fire suppression trying to protect 
Yellowstone. In 1990, following a year of post-fire review, Congress reimbursed the 
USFS for its suppression expenditures, demonstrating that fire suppression was so 
politically popular that budget constraints were irrelevant (Berry, 2007). Although formal 
institutions designed to set budget constraints are in place, the Yellowstone fires may 
have created an informal regime of congressional acceptance of overspending on 
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suppression. Because politicians are unlikely to refuse something as politically popular as 
more funding for fire suppression, USFS officials apparently discovered a reliable way of 
obtaining additional funding for their objective of managing fires. Thus, the Yellowstone 
fires may have marked the birth of the institutional blank-check mindset. 
As of 2015, more than half of the USFS’s budget and workforce is dedicated to 
fire management (U.S. Forest Service, 2015). The USFS regularly draws from an 
emergency fund when the costs of suppressing a fire exceed the appropriated sum, and 
Congress consistently reimburses these expenditures (Hoover and Bracmort, 2015). 
Although the USFS allows many wildland fires to burn in the backcountry, any fire that 
risks damage to public lives or property is suppressed regardless of cost. Some estimates 
suggest that from 50 to 95 percent of firefighting costs are spent exclusively to protect 
private property (U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2006). This may seem to be laudable 
use of federal funding, but a 2003 Office of Management and Budget report found that in 
some areas it would be cheaper to let structures burn and pay the full cost of rebuilding 
(Office of Management and Budget, 2003).  
Wildfires nowadays are easy ways for the USFS to expand its budget and 
bureaucratic purview by creating “political shows” of fire suppression. Even when local 
fire managers know that efforts to suppress a fire will not work, the fight continues. Not 
only is some wildfire suppression effectively useless, it also promotes moral hazard by 
encouraging development in areas that are at risk from wildfires. 
Focusing on suppression exclusively takes resources away from proactive 
management strategies that are more likely to reduce long-term fire risks. Some 230 
million acres of Forest Service and Department of Interior lands need to be treated for 
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their excessive fuel loads. Less than three million acres actually are treated each year, 
which is insufficient to reduce long-term risk (Gorte, 2013). Although proactive wildfire 
management is more cost-effective in the long-run, federal fire management agencies 
have an incentive to fight rather than to manage wildfires.  
Gregory Aplet, Senior Science Director for the Wilderness Society, claims that 
although federal fire management policy strongly supports proactive management, 
environmental policy “allows for good decisions to be made, but does not require those 
decisions to be made” (Aplet, 2006). Aplet (2006) claims that attitudinal, institutional, 
and political disincentives block the adoption of “Wildland Fire Use”, a form of proactive 
fire management. Those disincentives include risk aversion, suppression bias, regulatory 
burdens, and political opposition from both the public and commercial interests. 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
 
 
The “institutional blank-check” theory proposed here seeks to address the 
question: Do political institutions drive more severe and expensive wildfires?  
 
I have two hypotheses: 
 
H1: An institutional blank-check for fire-suppression spending supplies incentives for fire 
managers to exceed their appropriated budgets and then be reimbursed by Congress. 
 
H2: The institutional blank-check contributes to more money being spent on fire 
suppression and more acres being burned by wildfires. 
 
I hypothesize that an institutional blank-check for the U.S. Forest Service, which 
as the primary wildfire management agency, is reducing the efficiency of fighting 
wildfires. For the purpose of this study, I measure the efficiency of fighting wildfires in 
the inflation-adjusted cost per acre of wildfire suppression. This measure of efficiency is 
oversimplified, however, because spending nothing on fire suppression for ten years 
would appear to be a massive increase in efficiency, but would not actually address the 
problem of actively managing wildfires. For the tests used here, however, this measure is 
perfectly acceptable because of spending nothing on fire suppression is highly unlikely. 
Given the political demand, the federal government will continue to spend heavily on fire 
suppression, so minimizing the cost per acre is a reasonable measure of efficiency.  
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Future studies might focus on adopting a better, alternative measure of wildfire 
suppression efficiency by looking at the long-term minimization of property damage, 
lives lost, money spent, fuel buildup, and acres burned by wildfires, while simultaneously 
maximizing resource benefits.1 Data limitations prevent me from using a better measure 
of efficiency, but even with a simplified measurement this study contributes a new theory 
to the literature that can be tested in future work on wildfires.   
The foregoing hypothesis suggests that, while wildfires are getting more severe 
and expensive, both changes may be driven by bureaucratic and political inefficiencies 
rather than just ecological or climatic factors. A larger suppression budget does not 
necessarily mean that fires are being fought more efficiently. The marginal effect of each 
additional dollar spent on suppression is subject to diminishing marginal returns. If that is 
the case, some optimal wildfire suppression budget could be computed.  
The theoretical justification for the foregoing hypothesis is illustrated as a vicious 
cycle in Figure 2. Because fire suppression is in high demand politically, especially in 
states with lots of private and public development in at-risk areas, Members of Congress 
are likely to increase funding for fire suppression, regardless of the results of that 
additional spending. Such a funding mechanism creates an incentive for bureaucrats to 
focus more on suppression than wildfire prevention because they can maximize agency 
budgets while minimizing risks to themselves personally. Over time, a focus on 
suppression leads to more fuel buildup and more severe wildfires, which drives more 
                                                 
1 A more robust measure that considers many of these factors is the cost plus net-value change model (C + 
NVC). Owing to data limitations, however, this measurement will not be used. See Lankoande and Yoder 
(2006), Donovan, Prestemon and Gebert (2011), Clark et al., (2016) and Ellison, Moseley & Bixler (2015). 
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political demands for suppression. The cycle restarts, and fires increasingly become more 
expensive and severe.  
 
Figure 2. The Institutional Blank-Check. 
  
 
Political Demand for Wildfire 
Suppression 
Large wildfires drive a political 
demand for protection of life 
and property. 
More Severe Wildfires 
Fuel buildup leads to more 
severe wildfires, creating a 
culture of “political shows” in 
firefighting. 
Less Focus on 
Wildfire Prevention 
Suppression budgets take 
money from prevention 
budgets out of “emergency” 
need. 
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EXISTING LITERATURE 
 
 
Existing research suggests that investing in wildfire suppression is less effective 
than investing in pre-suppression efforts to reduce the value of wildfire losses 
(Lankoande and Yoder, 2006). Pre-suppression funding, however, often is not allocated 
on the basis of highest priority needs (Anderson and Anderson, 2012). Similarly, Garrett 
and Sobel (2003) looked at FEMA disaster payments and found that disaster relief is 
frequently allocated politically, rather than according to need. Existing studies of 
suppression and pre-suppression public spending raise concerns about the institutions that 
may be fueling the recent increases in wildfire severity and the cost of suppressing those 
wildfires (U.S. Forest Service, 2015). These institutions may be leading the Forest 
Service to spend more on fire suppression without regard for the monies’ actual 
effectiveness (O’Toole, 2007). 
Stephen Pyne’s (1982) work on the history of wildfires in America helps set the 
context for understanding fire regimes and human-wildfire interactions. Pyne suggests 
that wildfires once were seen as creating important benefits for humans around the world, 
but they are now seen widely as threats that the U.S. Forest Service, amongst other 
groups, is tasked with controlling. In the United States, using wildfires for resource 
benefits actively is being discouraged, despite the recognition that fire is a critical 
component of many forest ecosystems (van Wagtendonk, 2007). Even Gifford Pinchot, 
first Chief Forester of the U.S. Forest Service, recognized the role fires had in shaping 
many North American ecosystems, but still claimed “these facts do not imply any 
desirability in the fires which are now devastating the West” (Pinchot, 1899).  
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This article explores questions raised by the literature on wildfires using public 
choice theory, a field of political economy that uses economic analysis to study political 
behavior (Shughart, 2008). Public choice theory relies on “methodological 
individualism,” which adopts individuals rather than groups as the unit of analysis 
(Buchanan and Tullock, 1962). Political actors, whether elected representatives in 
Congress, appointed officials, bureaucrats, or voters, are not necessarily benevolent 
people pursuing the public good, but rather self-interested people pursuing more 
parochial objectives. Sometimes the self-interest is obvious, as when an elected official is 
trying to stay in office or a bureaucrat is trying to advance his career or obtain a larger 
budget, but sometimes political actors simply have a biased perception that their job is 
important enough to disregard or downplay other considerations (Buchanan and Tullock, 
1962).  
Fire suppression is a noble goal, but many of the political actors involved in 
shaping public policies may have a biased perception of suppression being the best or 
only strategy, despite the fact that fire ecologists point to the drawbacks of focusing 
exclusively on fire suppression. Political actors instead use the political process to obtain 
the benefits of wildfire suppression for their constituents, while externalizing the costs of 
such policies to the national taxpayer. 
  When those living in high-risk wildfire areas have ways of concentrating the 
benefits on themselves politically, they also have comparative advantages in the political 
process. Mancur Olson’s (1965) seminal work on The Logic of Collective Action suggests 
that a smaller, more cohesive group, such as those living in high-fire-risk areas, can bring 
more political influence to bear than a large, disorganized public. This theory suggests 
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that those living in high-risk areas may be more likely to provide Members of Congress 
with the political support necessary to implement suppression policies they find 
favorable. Because becoming informed about these issues is costly and the mathematical 
probability of changing the outcome of an election is close to zero, it is perfectly rational 
for the average voter to accept the status quo in which “concentrated benefits” dominate 
“diffuse costs” in the political process (Downs, 1957).  
The political process creates a means for people living in high-risk wildfire areas 
to receive fire suppression without bearing its full cost. By continuing to invest heavily in 
wildfire suppression, fire managers are promoting more development in these high-risk 
areas, known as the wildland-urban interface. The wildland-urban interface (WUI) is 
where development and wildlands meet or intermingle (Stein et al., 2013). Wildfire 
suppression policies thus promote moral hazard by creating an indirect subsidy for 
homeowners in the WUI where they do not bear the full cost of protecting property from 
wildfires (Reilly, 2015; Talberth, Berrens, McKee, and Jones, 2006). This subsidy 
encourages further development in high-risk areas, which raises the cost of suppression 
and the damages to lives and property in the event of a wildfire.  
Although fire managers recognize the disproportionate amounts of funding going 
to the WUI, they do not generally advocate for policy reform. Bureaucrats working for 
the Forest Service want to maximize their discretionary budgets because a larger budget 
makes it easier to do their jobs, which likewise could make the agency appear more 
prestigious (Niskanen, 1971). A larger budget means more responsibility, a broader 
bureaucratic jurisdiction, and a higher likelihood of a larger salary, more bonuses, or 
other indirect compensation like more workers to reduce an individual’s office workload. 
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Furthermore, even though bureaucrats do not face reelection pressures, they respond to 
public demands to for their agency’s services as well as to please Congress. Members of 
the House and Senate, especially those serving on committees overseeing the executive 
branch, reward agencies that help keep them in office (Weignast, 1984).  
The Forest Service’s incentive to suppress wildfires to please both the public and 
Congress often leads them to overspend their budget. But when the Forest Service spends 
all of its budget or overspends, Congress is likely to appropriate more money. Further, 
Congress regularly appropriates more funding for wildfire management than what is 
granted in the Interior Department’s appropriations bill (Hoover and Bracmort, 2015). 
Members of Congress generally want to focus on supplying highly visible benefits by 
suppressing wildfires when needed rather than funding background work that could 
prevent another disaster (Shughart, 2006). Because of this incentive to create highly 
visible fire suppression, federal fire managers tend to focus more on suppression than 
proactive management practices like wildland-fire use.   
15 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 
To examine the institutional blank-check hypothesis, a combination of statistical 
tests will attempt to explain the determinants of the efficiency of suppressing wildfires. 
The population of this study is 42 states for which data are available, covering years from 
2009 to 2015. This study relies on data from the U.S. Forest Service for state-by-state fire 
suppression costs from FY 2009 to FY 2015. Most other data are measured by year, not 
fiscal year, so the observations do not necessarily coincide perfectly. All costs are 
rounded to the nearest thousand dollars, and represent estimates only because the Forest 
Service measures fire expenditures by national forest and region, which often cross state 
boundaries (K. Carpenter, personal communication, April 6, 2016).  
The number of fires and acres burned in wildland fires for each state each year are 
provided by the National Interagency Coordination Center (NICC), which is responsible 
for coordinating wildland fire resources throughout the United States. The NICC is a 
subsidiary of the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC). The number of fires and acres 
burned comprise all wildland fires reported by federal, state, and local agencies, as well 
as private land managers for some states. Each state houses different combinations of 
federal, state, and local land managers reporting fires, although the observations available 
for study may reflect the type of land in each state rather than reporting differences. The 
cost per acre of suppressing wildfires is the total number of acres reported to have burned 
in wildland fires divided by the suppression expenditures for a given state. Those 
numbers do not include prescribed burns because this study is concerned only with fire 
suppression. 
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The Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) is adopted as a measure of the 
drought conditions in each state during each year. The PDSI is calculated on the basis of 
precipitation, temperature, and local soil water contents. The PDSI is a measure of how 
dry an area is, which provides useful information about how susceptible a forest is to 
wildfire. A larger PDSI is associated with wetter conditions, while a negative PDSI is 
associated with drought conditions. All PDSI data come from the National Climatic Data 
Center (NCDC), a subsidiary of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA). For this study, the PDSI is a 12-month average of statewide drought conditions. 
Although other regional differences affect wildfire susceptibility and severity, no 
systematic over- or underestimation of drought severity in all states is thought possible.  
Lightning data are taken from Vaisala, Inc., a private company under contract 
with the federal government to operate the National Lightning Detection Network. 
Vaisala reports the total number of lightning flashes observed in each state, which serves 
as a proxy for the vulnerability of national forests to lightning strikes. Not all observed 
flashes are cloud-to-ground strikes, but the number of flashes is assumed to be associated 
with the total number of such strikes (R. L. Holle, personal communication, February 4, 
2016). Lightning strikes are the predominant natural causes of wildfires, so these 
lightning data provide valuable insights into national forests’ susceptibilities to lightning-
induced wildfires.  
Population estimates are downloaded from the United States Census Bureau. 
Although the U.S. Census is conducted only once every ten years, the Census Bureau 
maintains a population estimates program that generates population figures for each year 
studied herein. 
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The total number of injuries and deaths from wildland fires are estimated by the 
NCDC’s Storm Events Database. If the institutional blank-check hypothesis holds, 
injuries and deaths are important components in wildfire-suppression spending decisions. 
States with more injuries and deaths from wildfires are likely to spend more on 
suppressing wildfires in the future to protect their citizens and firefighters. Some states 
consistently report no deaths or injuries, whereas others consistently report many such 
casualties. Oregon reported no deaths or injuries over the study period, but California 
reported 203 injuries and 10 deaths. The sources of those numbers are unclear, so the 
possibility exists of systematic underreporting in some states.  
The number of appropriations committee members counts the number of members 
each state has on the House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations. Because 
the Committee on Appropriations determines funding for federal agencies’ fire 
suppression, the institutional blank-check hypothesis would suggest that more 
representatives on this committee could secure more funding for their states. The 
committee members potentially change biennially, supplying four periods of different 
committee compositions over this study’s time period of focus. California has frequent 
and massive fires and had anywhere from 5 to 11 representatives sitting on this 
committee over the analysis period, whereas Indiana has relatively few (and small) fires 
and had no representatives on this committee. Representatives from states with more 
wildfires may have stronger incentives to request and be appointed by their party’s 
leadership to seats on that committee so as to influence funding allocations. 
The total land area of a state may affect the costs of fighting wildfires because 
larger states may find it harder to mobilize resources to suppress fires than geographically 
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smaller state. Area measurements are in square miles and are taken from U.S. Census 
Bureau reports.  
Binary variables are entered for seven U.S. regions (i.e., regional fixed effects): 
northeast, southeast, mountain west, California, central, southwest, and northwest. The 
regional dummy variables control for otherwise unexplained geographic differences 
impacting the USFS’s fire-suppression regime.2   
I rely on Forest Service budgets to generate a binary variable for whether the 
agency receives a budget increase. All Forest Service budgets come from budget 
overviews and budget justifications. The Forest Service reports the most recent year’s 
budget online, but for the earlier years in this dataset only U.S. Department of 
Agriculture reports are available online. Those sources both should contain similar 
numbers, although they most likely will not be exactly the same because of differences in 
methodologies. I will be using both data sources despite potential inconsistencies because 
they are the best data available to me.  
Finally, I control for state per capita incomes because wealthier states likely have 
more resources available locally for wildfire suppression. Wealthier states may have 
more households located in WUIs, especially as second homes. All of the observations on 
per capita incomes by state by year are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Two additional regions, Alaska and Hawaii, were controlled for originally, but insufficient data were 
available on those two states for inclusion in the final dataset. Although Alaska and Hawaii remain in the 
data tables, none of the tests use their information. 
19 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
Variable 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min. Max. 
Suppression 
Expenditures (2015 $) 
287 2.37e+07 6.61e+07 0 5.53e+08 
Cost per Acre of 
Suppression 
(2015 $) 
285 336.822 1,347.701 0 20446.36 
Number of Fires 
 
305 1,426.102 1,979.672 1 16,614 
Acres Burned  307 147,173.6 435,333 0 5,111,404 
Palmer Drought Severity 
Index 
294 0.181 2.346 -5.75 7.38 
Lightning Flashes 294 487,459.9 496,075.8 9018 4,071,174 
Appropriations 
Committee Members 
308 0.834 1.276 0 11 
Per Capita Income 294 41,237.14 6,027.134 28,884 57,705 
Injuries  301 1.398 7.474 0 97 
Deaths  301 0.159 1.260 0 19 
Politicians  308 0.834 1.276 0 11 
Land Area (Sq. Miles) 308 84,048.02 99,769.1 9,349.16 665,384 
USFS Suppression 
Budget 
(2015 $) 
308 7.75e+08 2.03e+08 5.10e+08 9.98e+08 
Budget Increase (2015 $) 308 -1.97e+07 1.93e+08 -4.58e+08 1.70e+08 
Budget Increase Binary 308 0.571 0.495 0 1 
Budget Increase Next 
Year Binary  
307 0.713 0.452 0 1 
 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of my variables over the period of the 
sample (FY 2009-2015).   
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The models I test use a panel dataset of 42 states from 2009 to 2015. The first test 
seeks to explain the determinants of the cost per acre of suppressing wildfires. After 
running a standard OLS regression, I found evidence of heteroscedasticity. I use a 
reiterative Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to account for this heteroscedasticity to 
estimate: 
(i) y(Cost/Acres Burned) =𝛽(Suppression Expenditures) + 𝛽(Number of Fires) 
+𝛽(Palmer Drought Severity Index) +𝛽(Population) + 𝛽(Injuries) 
+𝛽(Deaths)+ 𝛽(Politicians) + 𝛽(Land Area) + 𝛽(Region) + 𝛽(Budget 
Increase) +𝛽(Per Capita Income)  
 
The second test seeks to explain the determinant of suppression expenditures. I 
use a random effects model to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the states to 
estimate: 
(ii) y(Suppression Expenditures) = 𝛽(Acres Burned) + 𝛽(Acres Burned Last 
Period) + 𝛽(Suppression Expenditures Last Period) + 𝛽(Number of Fires) 
+𝛽(Lightning Flashes) + 𝛽(Palmer Drought Severity Index) + 𝛽(Population) 
+ 𝛽(Injuries) + 𝛽(Deaths) + 𝛽(Injuries Last Period) + 𝛽(Deaths Last Period) 
+ 𝛽(Politicians) + 𝛽(Land Area) + 𝛽(Region) + 𝛽(Region*Acres Burned) + 
𝛽(Per Capita Income)  
 
 
The final test estimates a probit model seeking to explain the factors that increase 
the probability of Forest Service budget increases: 
(iii) y(Probability of a Budget Increase Next Year) =𝛽(Suppression Expenditures) 
+ 𝛽(Suppression Expenditures 2 ) + 𝛽(Acres Burned) + 𝛽(Lightning Flashes) 
+ 𝛽(Palmer Drought Severity Index) + 𝛽(Population) +𝛽(Injuries) 
+𝛽(Deaths) + 𝛽(Politicians) + 𝛽(Land Area) + 𝛽(Region) 
+𝛽(Region*Acres Burned) +𝛽(Per Capita Income)  
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RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Table 2 
Regression Output Summary 
 
(i) Cost per 
Acre 
(ii) Suppression 
Expenditures 
(iii) Probability of a 
Budget Increase 
Suppression 
Expenditures 
1.41e-07 
(3.00e-06) 
 -1.48e-08 
(1.24e-08) 
Suppression 
Expenditures 
Last Period 
 0.140  
(0.032)*** 
 
Number of Fires -0.1685141 
(0.0972761)* 
807.972  
(1109.349) 
 
Acres Burned  372.580 
(28.593)*** 
0.0000199 
(0.0017968) 
Acres Burned 
Last Period 
 13.776 
(6.559)** 
 
Palmer Drought 
Severity Index 
3.955566 
(58.11045) 
-2,032,992 
(653,408.6)*** 
-0.099361 
(0.0481496)** 
Population -0.0000212 
(0.0000368) 
-0.335 
(0.416) 
1.59e-08 
(2.73e-08) 
Injuries -11.51143 
(20.96077) 
647,225.5 
(280,764.9)** 
-0.0046924 
(0.0445119) 
Injuries Last 
Period 
 -778,323.3 
(233,257.8)*** 
 
Deaths 9.623928 
(73.64988) 
1,201,302 
(1,016,825) 
0.4372841 
(0.5403693) 
Deaths Last 
Period 
 -348.578.4 
(973,013) 
 
Appropriations 
Committee 
Members 
17.3514 
(156.5624) 
4,269,929 
(1,794,452)** 
-0.0549231 
(0.1268221) 
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Table Continues 
 
Land Area 0.0039467 
(0.0044714) 
-26.655 
(59.987) 
4.22e-06 
(4.19e-06) 
Per Capita 
Income 
-0.0207793 
(0.0243824) 
-482.323 
(248.572)* 
-0.0000328 
(0.0000175)* 
Budget Increase -1.90e-07 
(5.55e-07) 
  
Obs. 
Adj. R2 
n=234  
-0.0434 
n=270 
0.9255 
n=277 
Pseudo R2=0.1030 
F-Stat 
Prob > F 
0.38 
0.9862 
Wald chi2=3020.27 
Prob>chi2=0.0000*** 
LR chi2=34.47 
Prob>chi2=0.0440** 
 
Model (ii) was tested for heteroscedasticity using the Breusch-Pagan test, which 
generated high Chi-squared values. The model was re-estimated by a reiterative 
Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.  
Note: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
The first regression does not provide adequate evidence to support the hypothesis 
that increasing suppression expenditures increases the cost per acre of suppressing 
wildfires. The only statistically significant variable explaining the cost per acre of 
suppressing wildfires is the total number of fires. According to this model, each 
additional declared wildfire is associated with a $0.17 reduction in the cost per acre of 
suppression. One potential explanation is that additional fires can make use of the same 
resources, which reduces the cost of suppressing them (i.e., fire suppression efforts are 
subject to economies of scale). Many of these fires may be suppressed with the same 
efforts, but this result ultimately tells us little about the institutional blank-check 
hypothesis. The negative adjusted R-squared (-0.0434) suggests that this model is not 
explaining almost anything that affects the cost per acre of wildfire suppression. 
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The second model appears to be much more robust with a substantially larger 
adjusted R-squared (0.9255). This model provides much more compelling evidence 
supporting the hypothesis. Relevant explanatory variables that are statistically significant 
include suppression expenditures from the previous year, acres burned, acres burned from 
the previous year, PDSI, injuries from wildfires, injuries from wildfires last year, the 
number of politicians sitting on the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee, 
and state per capita income. For this model, explanatory variables try to explain the total 
suppression expenditures for a given state. The coefficient on PDSI (-$2,032,992) is 
intuitive: drier climates produce more wildfires and, hence, greater suppression efforts. 
Holding the other variables constant, each additional point on the PDSI scale, indicating 
wetter conditions, is associated with $2,032,992 less in suppression expenditures.  
More interesting in this second model are the variables suggesting political 
influences on wildfire suppression funding. Each additional dollar spent on fire 
suppression in the past time period is associated with about $0.14 more in suppression 
expenditures in the current time period holding other explanatory variables constant. This 
provides some evidence to support the institutional blank-check, whereby spending more 
in one time period is likely to be associated with spending more the next time period. 
Acres burned in both the current and past time period are significantly and positively 
associated with suppression expenditures. Injuries in the current time period are 
positively and significantly associated with higher suppression expenditures, with each 
additional injury associated with about $647,000 more in suppression expenditures. 
Injuries likely promote a political response that elicits more demand for wildfire 
suppression, although injuries may also reflect the severity of a wildfire. Interestingly, 
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injuries in the past time period are significant and negatively associated with suppression 
expenditures. This suggests that an injury in the previous fire season is associated with 
spending $778,000 less on fire suppression holding other explanatory variables constant. 
One potential explanation could be that fire managers are less likely to aggressively fight 
fires if they think this strategy could jeopardize firefighters’ lives.  
The coefficient on the number of representatives who sit on the House Natural 
Resources Appropriations Committee is also positive and significantly associated with 
suppression expenditures. The results from this test suggest that each additional 
appropriations committee member is associated with about $4.3 million more in fire 
suppression, holding other explanatory variables constant. This marginal effect of a state 
having a representative on the Appropriations Committee strongly suggests political 
motives behind fire suppression.  
The coefficient on per capita income is significant at the 10 percent level in this 
model, but the coefficient is negative. This may suggest that wealthier states are less 
likely to spend more on fire suppression, although this may also reflect differences in 
where wealthier households live. 
The final probit regression does not provide adequate evidence to support the 
hypothesis. The only statistically significant explanatory variables are the PDSI and per 
capita income. The model fails to provide enough evidence to suggest that larger 
suppression expenditures will increase the probability of the Forest Service receiving a 
larger budget the following year. Interestingly, per capita income is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level with a negative coefficient (-0.0000328). Although the 
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coefficient is very small, this finding suggests that states with higher per capita incomes 
actually have a smaller probability of increasing Forest Service budgets.  
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DISCUSSION 
 
 
The results of these regression analyses provide some evidence to support the 
hypothesis that politics drives wildfire suppression efforts. The strongest finding suggests 
that, holding acres burned, drought conditions, number of fires, and other control 
variables constant, a state with more representatives sitting on the House Committee of 
Natural Resources is associated with higher levels of spending on wildfire suppression. 
These politicians face public pressures to protect their constituents’ private property 
using federal funding regardless of cost, which raises the cost of managing wildfires.   
Emphasizing wildfire suppression regardless of cost creates an indirect subsidy 
for property owners living in the WUI. The subsidy promotes moral hazard by 
encouraging more development in at-risk areas, which leads to more need for costly and 
inefficient suppression. Local communities that are in charge of zoning are not 
incentivized to discourage development in at-risk areas, and instead allow development to 
collect the increased revenues knowing they do not need to pay the cost of protecting 
these properties. A disproportionate number of homes built in these areas are actually 
second-homes, suggesting that this is not only an indirect subsidy to property owners, but 
an indirect subsidy to wealthy property owners who can likely afford the cost of insuring 
their homes for wildfire risks (Headwaters Economics, 2009). This subsidy is likely 
driving up the cost of suppressing wildfires, as the Forest Service spends more each year 
on protecting these properties.  
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If the cost were shifted to the local communities and people living in at-risk areas, 
there would be more incentive to construct homes in a way to minimize the risk of 
damage from wildfires. Because land use planning is a local government responsibility 
and the cost of defending homes is a state and federal burden, local governments tend to 
allow development in risky areas and promote moral hazard. These local communities 
keep the revenues from development without paying the cost to protect these 
developments.  
One option to reduce wildfire suppression expenditures is to create more fire 
adapted communities. Property owners can develop the WUI with minimal risk of 
wildfire damage by implementing certain practices. The USFS’s FIREWISE program 
provides guidelines for how to minimize this risk, but only some two percent of the 
70,000 at-risk communities undergo this certification (Rasker, 2015). Further, wildfire 
risk is not fully assessed by insurance companies, which have inspected less than three 
percent of the 46 million at-risk homes for wildfire survivability. 
Although USFS employees have the best intentions, the bureaucracy’s 
institutional realities have been driving bad outcomes in wildfire management in the 
United States. Fire managers can be disciplined and even fired for escaped prescribed 
fires or wildland fire use, but there is virtually no risk of losing a job by overspending on 
fire suppression. When combined with regulatory burdens to proactive management, 
including provisions of the Clean Air Act that discourage prescribed burning, fire 
managers find it much easier to suppress a fire than to manage a forest to prevent future 
fires (Weisz, n.d.). Knowing that there are minimal budget constraints to fire suppression, 
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most fire managers face an incentive to spend exorbitantly on fire suppression to create a 
political show of public benefits. These political shows and public benefits create an 
image of the USFS as protector of the forest and human life and property, which 
maintains public support for the agency. As far as congressional funding goes, when 
managers have a good fire season they can point to their successes and request similar 
levels of funding the following year. When managers have a bad fire season, they can 
argue they did not have enough funding and request additional funding. Wildfire 
suppression budgets keep increasing, but there is never any check on USFS power to 
make sure these budget increases are actually effective.  
Fire managers are risk averse towards prescribed fires, one of the most effective 
methods for proactively mitigating wildfire risk (Maguire and Albright, 2005). Mental 
shortcuts tend to bias fire management decision-making towards risk aversion. For 
example, because prescribed fires have the potential to escape and become wildland fires, 
fire managers often abide by a precautionary principle, preferring the certainty of “no 
fire” to an alternative risk of escaped fires on the manager’s watch.  
Although risk aversion plagues all fire managers, government is particularly bad 
at responding to disasters like wildfires. Government fails to adequately handle disaster 
relief for three primary reasons (Shughart, 2006). First, politicians and bureaucrats are 
incentivized to make decisions with highly visible results that they can take credit for, so 
government officials tend to under-prepare for emergencies instead focusing on post-
disaster response. Second, each level of government tries to control the one below it by 
imposing detailed rules to restrict discretionary authority. Fire managers on the ground 
who know what needs to be done are often separated by multiple levels of bureaucracy 
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from the decision makers. Finally, government disaster relief is subject to high levels of 
corruption and bureaucratic waste because of a general lack of oversight and 
accountability. 
Responding to a wildfire is ultimately a question of how best to allocate resources 
to where they are needed most. Central authorities are inefficient at finding ways to 
mobilize firefighters, aircraft, shelters, and other resources needed during a severe 
wildfire. The solution to this problem is to utilize dispersed knowledge, allowing 
individual actors to coordinate with each other through pricing mechanisms (Hayek, 
1945). Without price distortions from government control, insurance companies, 
firefighting groups, residential developments, and all forms of disaster relief could find 
an optimal supply of their goods and services to mitigate the risk of wildfires, as well as 
respond to them appropriately.  
Past fire suppression and fuel buildup from declining timber harvest from 
environmental policies like the Endangered Species Act makes current fire management 
more expensive and dangerous. But after decades of supposed fuels management, one 
would expect forests are becoming less dangerous to manage. The USFS still struggles to 
proactively manage fires because the agency has always focused more on suppression 
than reducing fuel buildup. Even if the agency did consistently manage a few million 
acres each year to reduce fuel buildup, the tens of millions of acres managed by the USFS 
would never have all of its fuel buildup removed.   
Smokey Bear’s adage “Only you can prevent wildfires” is a naive reflection of a 
widespread belief that we can control a natural phenomenon. Wildfires, just like 
tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, and flash floods, have existed since before written 
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history, and will long outlast any person. Wildfires are unique, however, in that they are 
not solely the result of atmospheric conditions, but have also been started and managed 
by humans. Rather than try to abolish all wildfires, we have the tools to manage them for 
resource benefits and minimize the damages inflicted from wildfires. By reforming the 
institutions, incentives, and regulatory burdens that fire managers and developers face, 
the costs of managing and living with wildfires will fall and the severity of those 
wildfires will likely follow. 
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